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"We are willing to praise freedom when she is safely tucked
away in the past and cannot be a nuisance. In the present, amidst
danger whose outcome we cannot foresee, we get nervous about her,
and admit censorship."
E.M. Forester
"The first principle of a free society is an untrammeled flow of
words in an open forum."
Adlai Stevenson
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication on the Internet has provided the world with the
ability to exchange information, ideas, and opinions without crossing
borders' or incurring major expenses. 2 Due to the abundance of in-
1. See E. Walter Van Valkenburg, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 75 OR. L. REV.
319, 320 (1996) (stating people use Internet to access infinite amounts of information); Sean
Adam Shiff, Comment, The Good, the Bad, the Ugly: Criminal Liability for Obscene and ln-
decent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 732 (1996) (noting that Inter-
net allows people to communicate interactively and instantaneously with others around world);
Joanna H. Kim, Comment, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of Local Community Stan-
dards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer NetworkAge, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 415,
417 (1995) (opining that "computer networks are the up-and-coming means of exchanging
'electronic conversation,' offering cheap and instant global communication"); see also Donna
A. Gallagher, Comment, Free Speech on the Line: Modern Technology and the First Amend-
ment, 3 CoMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 197, 198 (1995) (stating that growth of technology has in-
creased information exchange). The Internet is defined as a collection of networks that is gov-
erned by certain rules or languages that enables computers to communicate with each other.
PAUL HOFFMAN, NETSCAPE AND THE WORLDWIDE WEB FOR DUMMIES 12 (2d ed. 1996). Al-
though they are not exact synonyms for each other, their technological differences are irrele-
vant for the purposes of this Comment. In this Comment, the term "Internet" shall be used
interchangeably with "cyberspace," "information superhighway," and "computer networks".
2. See John S. Zanghi, "Community Standards" in Cyberspace, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV.
95, 96 (1995) (noting that price of computers is becoming increasingly affordable); Pamela A.
Huelster, Cybersex and Community Standards, 75 B.U. L. REV. 865, 867 (1995) (noting that
Bulletin Boards (BBS) are one of least expensive forms of mass media). The minimal equip-
ment requirements to gain access to the information superhighway are a computer, a modem,
and a telephone line. See Shift, supra note I (listing equipment required to access Intemet). A
person can access the Internet "[w]ith minimal equipment, effort, and knowledge." Gallagher,
supra note 1; cf. Peter D. Kennedy & James A. Hemphill, Publishing on the Internet, 4 TEX.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 33, 34 (1995) (noting that publishing has become less expensive because of
availability of computer networks). The advent of the Internet has allowed writers to distribute
their materials simply and inexpensively over the Internet. Id. But see M. Ethan Katsh,
Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681,
1693 (arguing that communication via Internet is still far away "from an easy-to-use, flexible,
widely accessible, and broadly used network of electronic information").
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formation and the minimal requirements necessary to engage in this
form of communication, the Internet has become a method of com-
munication that has the potential to permeate every aspect of peoples'
lives.3 This new medium has experienced incredible growth and has
prospered without much regulation.4 The Internet, unlike other forms
of media, is not owned or controlled by any single entity.5 This al-
lows people to communicate on the Internet using aliases, while so-
cietal barriers to information cease to exist.6
3. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1758 (1995) (describing various ways the Internet could affect peoples' lives in future). Some
examples of the possible impact are: being able to view art that would usually be limited to
people located in a particular city, gaining access to the best schools and teachers regardless of
geographic location, and being able to shop without ever leaving the house. Id.; see also Nor-
man Redlich & David R. Lurie, First Amendment Issues Presented by the "Information Super-
highway", 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1446, 1447 (1995) (predicting that video stores and librar-
ies could be replaced by Internet); Shari Steele, Taking a Byte Out of the First Amendment,
HUM. RTS. Q., Spring 1996, at 14 (describing the Internet as having "the potential for giving
voice to the previously disenfranchised"). The Internet has been praised for "putting the
'printing press' in the hands of the people." Id.
4. See Randolph Stuart Sergent, The "Hamlet" Fallacy: Computer Networks and the
Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 671, 672 (1996)
(describing growth of Internet as example of computer networks' impact on modem communi-
cation). The Internet currently has an estimated thirty million users and it is predicted its
membership will reach one billion after the start of next century. 1d. The number of people
accessing the Internet increases by approximately 10 to 15 percent annually. Id. See Debra D.
Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Callfor a New Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J.
L. & TECH. 87, 88 (1996) (noting one thousand percent increase in growth of Internet sub-
scribers in recent years); Shiff, supra note 1 (listing current and future growth rates of Internet
users). The phenomenal success of Netscape, Inc. is indicative of the predicted growth of the
Internet. Netscape, a software company that produces programs to navigate the Internet, had
its initial public offering price dramatically increase from $27 to $71 in its first day of trading.
Joshua Cooper Ramo & David S. Jackson, Winner Take All: An Epic Battle is Taking Place
Betveen Microsoft and Netscape, TIME, Sept. 16, 1996, at 56.
5. See Burke, supra note 4, at 92 (explaining there is no central authority governing the
Internet); Shiff, supra note 1 (explaining that the Internet is not governed by any single
authority); Gallagher, supra note I (describing Internet as "a 'free space' that no one controls
or owns"). Because no central authority governs the Internet, users can discuss almost any
topic without fear of legal repercussions. Id. See Barbara M. Ryga, Comment, Cyberporn:
Contemplating the First Amendment, 6 SEToN HALL CONST. L.J. 221, 223 (concluding speech
on Internet is unrestricted because there is no "regulatory body"); cf Redlich & Lurie, supra
note 3, at 1448 (explaining that "role of government (if any) in regulating such new communi-
cations enterprises has... yet to be defined").
6. See Huelster, supra note 2, at 868 (showing that Internet has become chief mode of
information exchange because it allows anonymous communication); Anne Wells Branscomb,
Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyber-
spaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1640 (1995) (holding that communication over Internet has eradi-
cated prejudices that exist in visual modes of communication). Cyberspace is an entity where
"everyone is welcome, regardless of gender, age, race, or association; it is a place where both
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Attempts to regulate obscene or indecent speech in this new
communication forum has brought about much controversy. 7 Legis-
lators and courts have attempted to balance the constitutional right to
free speech with the right of government to protect minors and non-
consenting adults from indecent material. 8 However, traditional ob-
liberals and conservatives thrive, where pedophiles live and Nazis roam freely." Ryga, supra
note 5; see Ann Beeson, Top Ten Threats to Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, HUM. RTS. Spring
1996, at 10, 12 (arguing that anonymity allows people to discuss sensitive issues such as sex
education and gay rights). But see Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Ac-
countability, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642 (1995) (noting that anonymity promotes illegal be-
havior because no legal punishment is available); Mike Royko, Freedom of Creeps Has No
Place in On-line Bill ofRights, Cmi. TRIB., Feb. 13, 1996, at 3 (claiming anonymity on Internet
is for "creeps and cowardly curs"). The Internet provides a tranquil dialogue forum for peo-
ple, who if they were talking face to face, would most likely engage in physical violence to-
wards one another. For example, in an Internet setting an African-American and a member of
the Ku Klux Klan could unknowingly engage in conversation about a common interest, such as
watching college football. It would seem extremely unlikely that these two individuals would
discuss college football over the telephone or in person.
7. See Allen S. Hammond, IV, Indecent Proposals: Reason, Restraint, and Responsi-
bility in the Regulation of Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 259, 263 (1996) (arguing
that legislation "inhibits the freedom to engage in electronic speech and association activity
which technology promotes"); Beeson, supra note 6, at 10 (asserting that there has been influx
of censorship legislation aimed at computer networks). During an interviewed debate with one
of the authors of the CDA, a computer magazine editor argued that if permissible indecent
speech is not protected, the government will begin to censor all types of speech currently pro-
tected by the Constitution. Id. See Lisa Granatstein, A Battle Over Bytes: Should Cyberspace
be Censored?, TiME, Apr. 8, 1996, at 14 (quoting Emanuel Goldstein as speculating that if
pornographic speech is not protected, "the next people victimized will be a little closer to
home"). But see Hammond, supra, at 261 (stating that legislation is necessary to address pub-
lic health issues like teenage pregnancy and child development). A noted columnist argues
that legislation is needed because parents find themselves in a Catch-22: they buy their chil-
dren computers to supplement their education, but since parents must work to pay for these
electronic devices, they are unable to monitor their children's on-line explorations. Royko,
supra note 6.
8. See Burke, supra note 4, at 92 (indicating that availability ofporography to children
on the Internet is a major concern of some Americans). The debate within the judiciary and
legislature centers upon the inevitable fact that laws which attempt to aid parents in the protec-
tion and proper upbringing of their children can also "undermine efforts to promote and pro-
tect opportunities for free expression." Hammond, supra note 7, at 263; see Shiff, supra note
I (noting courts have difficult task in balancing right to free speech with government interest
in protecting society); cf. Dennis W. Chin, Comment, Obscenity on the Internet: Local Com-
munity Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on the Information Superhighway, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 185, 186 (1995) (asserting that congressional debates over Internet regulation
are preview of legal battles heading to Supreme Court). Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives Newt Gingrich criticized Senator Exon's proposed legislation aimed at censoring the In-
teret because it was "clearly a violation of the First Amendment." Id. at 185.
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scene speech doctrines have been difficult to apply to the Internet be-
cause of the unique characteristics of the medium.9
In February of 1996, Congress enacted the Communications De-
cency Act ("CDA").O The Act mandates that if a person or organi-
zation affirmatively provides obscene or indecent material to non
consenting adults or children, penalties will be imposed by fime, im-
prisonment for not more than two years, or both. l This legislation
was praised by family groups as providing a method to monitor the
content to which their children are exposed when exploring the Inter-
net.12 However, when the CDA was passed, a substantial public
backlash ensued because many Internet users believed the Act would
infringe upon areas of speech protected by the First Amendment. 13
9. See Shiff, supra note 1, at 731 (noting difficulty of applying obscenity doctrines to
cyberspace); see also Frederick B. Lim, Obscenity and Cyberspace: Community Standards in
an On-Line World, 20 COLUM. VLA J.L. & ARTS 291, 294 (1996) (indicating that the commu-
nity standard, used in current obscenity law, is problematic when applied to Internet). Two
specific features of the Internet, "lack of correlation to physical space and mass distribution
capabilities available to individuals," make the Internet different from all other types of com-
munication mediums. Id. at 295. Cf. Andrew Spett, Comment, A Pig in the Parlor: An Ex-
amination of Legislation Directed at Obscenity and Indecency on the Internet, 26 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 599, 617 (1996) (arguing that telephones, regulated under current obscenity
doctrines, possess different operational characteristics than Internet); Kim, supra note 1, at 415
(noting that lack of physical boundaries has resulted in "both substantive and procedural legal
complications"). The lack of fixed geographic sites on the Internet make it difficult to deter-
mine proper venue locations to implement a proper obscenity standard tests. Id.
10. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 1993 and Supp.
1997).
11. Id.
12. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Internet Babylon? Does the Carnegie-Mellon Study Of
Pornography on the Information Superhighway Reveal a Threat to the Stability of Society?, 83
GEO. L.J. 1935, 1937 (1995) (noting that many people's distaste with Internet results from its
saturation of pornographic images and ease of access to them); Laura J. McKay, Note, The
Communications Decency Act: Protecting Children from Online Pornography, 20 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 463, 483 (1996) (advocating CDA as necessary to combat exposure of pornog-
raphy to children exploring Internet); Granatstein, supra note 7 (reporting Senator Exon be-
lieves CDA should protect children). But see Leahy-Finegold Bill Introduced to Repeal New
Internet Censorship Law, Government Press Releases, Feb. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8783184 (noting CDA could "actually work counter to its stated goals of protecting chil-
dren"). The CDA has the potential to be counterproductive because it could lessen demand by
parents for screening software that is already available. Id. But see Branscomb, supra note 12,
at 1938 (arguing that society, not government, should take initial step to regulate pornography
in new media).
13. See Richard N. Coglianese, Comment, Sex, Bytes, and Community Entrapment: The
Need for a New Obscenity Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 385,
385 (1995) (arguing that government attempts to regulate the Internet raises First Amendment
issues); see also hIternet Junkies Celebrate Ruling Court's Blocking of Law seen as Victory for
Free Speech, S.F. EXAMINER, June 13, 1996, at Al (arguing that wording of CDA reached ar-
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Electronic publishers and other technological entities criticized
the CDA as encroaching on their protected free speech rights.' 4 As a
result, two lawsuits were filed against the Department of Justice
claiming that the Communications Decency Act was unconstitutional
because it restricted First Amendment protected communication on
the Internet. In both ACLU v. Reno 5 and Shea v. Reno16 two separate
courts held the CDA to be unconstitutional. Therefore, both district
courts issued preliminary injunctions holding that the CDA was not
to be enforced. 17
This article argues the bases for finding the CDA to be uncon-
stitutional. Part II will provide a historical perspective of the Internet
and a brief history of obscenity regulation in the United States. Part
Ill will explain the purpose of the Communications Decency Act and
the legal basis for the subsequent judicial interpretation of the Act.
Part IV will explain the difficulties in censoring speech on Internet
eas of protected free speech). Internet sites that could have been labeled as indecent under the
language of the CDA include topics such as AIDS or the exhibition of images from the Sistine
Chapel. Id.; see also Calvin Reid, Court Ruling Awaited on Communications Decency Act,
PUBLISHERS WKLY, May 27, 1996, at 12 (noting that Human Rights Watch issued documents
that criticizes trend toward Internet censorship). An editorial advocating the acceptance of free
speech stated: "[t]he bill of Rights has stood us well for 200-plus years. You'd think we'd
have learned to trust it by now." Editorial, Internet Ruling Gives Free Speech Its Due, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, June 14, 1996, at 35, 35.
14. See McKay, supra note 12, at 486 (contending that CDA is criticized because it in-
fringes upon both First Amendment and constitutional privacy rights); Beeson, supra note 6, at
10 (arguing that CDA restricts protected speech); Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You:
Cybeiporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38 (noting that CDA would "transform the vast library of
the Internet into a children's reading room"); Two Federal Laivsuits Filed in Philadelphia
Seeking to Overturn the Communications Decency Act, AP, June 12, 1996, available in 1996
WL 4427369 (arguing that CDA will cause government to prosecute any person who distrib-
utes materials related to sex). One of the plaintiffs in ACLU v. Reno criticized the CDA be-
cause it would prosecute people for discussing "AIDS, abortion, politics, and science." Id.
See Computers: Internet Censorship Blocked, Facts on File World News Digest, June 13,
1996, available in 1996 WL 8621172 (noting civil rights groups have criticized CDA for vio-
lating freedom of expression). See generally Coglianese, supra note 13, at 414 (commenting
that censorship is "equivalent of treating dandruff with decapitation").
15. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 826 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, Reno v. ACLU, 117
S.Ct. 2329 (1997); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aft'd, Reno v. Shea,
117 S.Ct. 2501 (1997).
16. Both courts declared the CDA unconstitutional because the wording of the statute
was overly broad. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 853-55; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp at 916.
However, only the ACLU court held that the statute was too vague. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp at 857.
17. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp at 883 (granting preliminary injunction in favor of
ACLU); Shea, 930 F. Supp at 950 (granting preliminary injunction in favor of Shea).
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and propose alternatives to regulating obscenity on the Internet other
than the CDA.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CYBERSPACE
A. The Internet: A New Medium
Understanding the characteristics of the Internet is essential to
appreciate the difficulty of applying obscenity law to this unique
method of communication. The Internet is an association of self-
owned computer networks, which include businesses, universities,
governmental bodies, and individual persons. 18 A person interested
in "Surfing the 'Net"' must subscribe with a service provider.19 The
service provider, for a monthly membership fee, will provide the cu-
rious with the ability to access the Internet.20 As previously noted, a
person requires only a computer, modem, and telephone line to ac-
cess the Internet once he or she has subscribed to a service provider.21
There are four primary avenues one can take when they are
communicating over the Internet.22 One of the most widely-used In-
ternet services is the electronic bulletin board ("BBS"). 23 This serv-
ice received its name because it is strikingly similar to a typical bul-
18. See Shiff, supra note 1, at 733 (describing groups of individuals that are linked to-
gether by Internet).
19. See DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR USERS 19 (1994) (describing re-
quirements to access Internet).
20. Id. at 25.
21. Id. at 19.
22. To illustrate the relationship of these Internet services, this hypothetical concerning
obscene material will be explained. To begin, Joe Smith is surfing the Internet and enters into
a BBS that is topically described as "Nude Photographs." while reading the notes posted
about nude photos, Joe reads a message that is advertising the availability of nude photos. In
order to gain access to these photographs, the instructions require Joe to submit an age-
identifying document to an e-mail address. After Joe submits his age verification, he turns off
his computer. The next day, Joe has a new e-mail message in his electronic mailbox. The
message tells Joe he is of legal age to view the nude photographs. Because there is such a va-
riety of nude photographs available, Joe must use a Telnet to access a catalog that describes
and gives locations of the different types of photographs. Because Mr. Smith subscribes to the
philosophy, the more the merrier, he uses a File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to locate and down-
load thousands of his favorite nude photographs. This hypothetical illustrates a possible rela-
tionship of Internet services. It is neither exclusive nor limited to the access of photographs.
23. See DERN, supra note 19, at 197 (noting that millions of people explore and contrib-
ute to Usenet); Eric Handleman, Comment, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current Ob-
scenity Standard Provide Individuals With the Proper Constitutional Safeguards?, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 709, 709 (1995) (acknowledging popularity of electronic BBS).
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letin-board. 24  A BBS is "an area where messages can be posted,
read, and responded to in a non-real-time discussion. ' 25  Another
popular service available on the Internet is electronic mail (e-mail). 26
E-mail allows a person to instantaneously transmit typed messages,
textual documents, graphics, or voice messages to other people who
have an e-mail address.27 Along with its rapid speed of transmission,
e-mail is also highly regarded because it allows its users to transmit
and receive mail in privacy.28 Privacy is further augmented in an e-
mail environment due to the fact that its senders and recipients are
not required to use their real names; additionally, addresses do not
reveal a physical location.29
The third primary Internet service is dubbed File-Transfer Pro-
tocol ("FTP"). FTP is a service available on the Internet which al-
24. See Handleman, supra note 23 (showing that BBS, like traditional bulletin-boards,
allow people to contribute text or pictures, read contributions by others, or engage in dialogue
with other BBS users). For purposes of this discussion, the term "electronic-bulletin board"
with be used interchangeably with Usenet. Usenet is defined as "an informal, rather anarchic,
group of systems that exchange 'news' which is "essentially similar to 'bulletin boards' on
other networks." DERN, supra note 19, at 195. Electronic BBS are similar to real-life discus-
sion groups in the sense that "an electronic BBS permits an individual to listen to a conversa-
tion, ask questions, occasionally interject small comments, or contribute lengthy statements."
DOUGLAS E. COMER, THE INTERNET BOOK: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
NETWORKING AND HOw THE INTERNET WORKS 158 (2d ed. 1995).
25. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: USER'S GUIDE& CATALOG 588 (Acad. ed. 1996);
see DERN, supra note 19, at 196 (explaining that BBS postings are categorized by topic). The
messages that are posted on BBS are organized according to topics. Id.; Chiu, supra note 8, at
200 (stating that BBS allow users to post and read messages). Other choices of communication
in the discussion groups include the right to post a note for others in the BBS group to read and
the ability to send messages that respond to other's posted notes. Id. One has the ability to
periodically examine the BBS to see whether new messages have been posted and, if so, to
read some or all of the new postings. Id.
26. See Sergent, supra note 4, at 676 (1996) (identifying e-mail as a widely used Internet
service).
27. See COMER, supra note 24, at 290 (clarifying how electronic mail works). Electronic
mall is defined as "a service that permits one to send to another person, a group, or a computer
program" and also allows a user to reply to incoming memos. .d. E-mail users have become
so accustomed to the velocity of e-mail transmission, that they have begun to criticize tradi-
tional mail as being "snail-mail" because of its snail-like speed of delivery. Id.
28. See JOHN R. LEVINE & CAROL BAROUDI, THE INTERNET FOR DUMMIES 77 (1993)
(describing privacy issues of e-mail). The only way someone can read an e-mail message is if
they possess the correct password, which descrambles the encryption to readable text. d. But
see Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Policies for Use on the Internet, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 14,
1995, at 3, 10 (discussing how corporations may reduce liability for misuse of Internet com-
munications by implementing internal regulation).
29. See LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 28, at 67 (explaining that e-mail addresses only
require a name which can be fictional).
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lows users to download files from one computer to another.30 After a
user connects to a remote computer, he must enter a log-in name and
password.31 Like a BBS or e-mail, some FTP servers allow private
interaction by allowing anonymous log-in names and passwords
when accessing files.32 FTP's have inherent advantages over e-mail
and BBS services because they only require one person to implement
the communication process; as well, they are more efficient in the
transfer of voluminous amounts of information.3 3 An FTP eliminates
the need for organizations to provide actual delivery of files or
documents. It allows organizations located in different geographic
areas to distribute and share the same information instantaneously. 34
The fourth service available on the Internet is telnet. Telnet is a
program that allows its users to log into other computer systems us-
ing the Telnet protocol. 35 Thus, it enables a person to interact with a
remote computer network.36 For example, a person in Dallas could
use Telnet to browse a card catalog system in a San Francisco library.
Telnet virtually creates the ability to access and explore other com-
puter networks as if that person is in the computer network's geo-
graphic location.37
B. Analogizing the Internet: Does Application of Existing Law
Work?
The incredible popularity of the Internet, coupled with the mas-
sive amounts of pornography available online,3 has brought the
30. COMER, supra note 24, at 145.
31. DERN, supra note 19, at 277.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 270 (stating that FTP is "cheaper and easier" because it does not require all
of its users to possess large hard drives capable of storing large files).
34. Id. For example, an insurance corporation with its main computer in New York,
could via the Internet, instantly delivery hurricane insurance applications to its Miami office.
Simultaneously, the Los Angeles office could access the insurance companies' main computer
in New York to download information concerning earthquake insurance. This type of infor-
mation exchange is not only faster than regular mail but it also cuts overhead by eliminating
the payroll of employees at corporate headquarters who must answer and fulfill requests from a
corporation's branch locations.
35. See KROL, supra note 25, at 115 (explaining how a person uses Telnet).
36. Id. at 52.
37. Id.
38. See Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Sur-
vey of 917, 410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million
Thnes by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83
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regulation of obscenity in cyberspace to the forefront of the Ameri-
can conscious. The method that information is disseminated over the
information superhighway changes almost daily, while the laws
aimed at regulating content on the Internet have been slothful in re-
sponding to this new and amorphous communication medium.39
Legislators have attempted to regulate obscene material on the
Internet by analogizing it to other methods of communication. 0 In
order to alleviate the difficulty of analogizing the multi-functioning
Internet with other communication mediums, some commentators
have attempted to specify the type of service being rendered by the
Internet when there is an issue of obscene speech.41
"Real-time" chat, via e-mail or BBS, could easily be compared
to a telephone line because both telephone lines and Internet services
are relaying messages between parties.42 Because of this functional
commonality, e-mail, BBS, and telephone lines are considered sec-
GEO. L.J. 1849, 1913 (1995) (acknowledging that computer networks have enabled pornogra-
phy to be voluminously disseminated to a worldwide audience).
39. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking the
Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTtNGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 282 (1994) (criticizing constitu-
tional rights in communications regulation as being "utterly unsuited to the new media envi-
ronment"). The legal process and its attempt to articulate constitutional standards for new
communication mediums usually takes years or decades, while communication mediums are
evolving over a much shorter time period. Id.; Michael Johns, Comment, The First Amend-
ment and Cyberspace: Trying to Teach Old Doctrines New Tricks, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1383,
1392-93 (1996) (noting that growth of Internet has "outstripped the ability of the law to keep
pace").
40. See Zanghi, supra note 2, at 110 (stating that although obscenity regulation laws are
intended for bookstores and X-rated movie theaters, some legal professionals "believe that
courts could extend laws to regulate on-line obscenity"); Lim, supra note 9, at 301 (comparing
similarities of Internet to publishers and speakers). The characteristics of a BBS tend to re-
semble both a "publisher or speaker who originates and distributes material" and in some in-
stances a BBS resembles a "republisher or common carrier." Id.
41. See Lim, supra note 9, at 301. (subjecting BBS users to "First Amendment stan-
dards, depending upon types of services offered and constitutional standards applicable to
each").
42. See Phillip H. Miller, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amend-
ment Status of Electronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1190 (1993)
(comparing Internet services with telephone services because both systems communicate over
phone lines). But see Lim, supra note 9, at 301 (arguing that a common carrier such as a tele-
phone does not act as a "perfect metaphor" for comparison to the Internet). The first reason
why the Internet is different from the telephone is the fact that telephones are legally required
to offer its services without discrimination, whereas the Internet voluntarily offers its services
without discrimination. The second reason is that even though Internet does not intentionally
discriminate against its users, due to the price of computers and modems, an economic dis-
crimination does in fact occur. On the contrary, telephone lines are regulated as public utilities
and as such, they are reasonably affordable by people of all different levels of income. Id.
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ondary publishers. 43 Another Internet service that can be associated
with the telephone is Telnet. The similarity exists because both
communication mediums can assist the user in locating information. 44
A telephone line has directory assistance that provides its user with
the phone number of specific individuals. Similarly, telnet provides
its user with the exact location of specific information.45 However,
Internet services differ drastically from telephone services because a
BBS "do[es] not own or control transmission channels. ' 46 The BBS
only controls the actual services which are carried over phone lines
that are owned by other entities.47
Some people have attempted to associate e-mail with the postal
service, its "land-based counterpart. '48 Analogies to other commu-
nication mediums seem difficult to ascertain. The comparison of In-
ternet services to broadcasters is nebulous because a BBS does not
"transmit signals over public airwaves, and they are not required to
operate under a government license. ' 49 Because Internet services do
not require licenses to operate, they escape the Federal Communica-
tion Commission's ("FCC") right to regulate "broadcasters or com-
mon carriers."5 Others have advocated analogizing the Internet to
print publishers. They claim that there is a close fit because Internet
services resemble electronic publishers by "providing subscribers
with information in text and graphic form." 51 Despite these attempts
to analogize, traditional media distinctions used to formulate differ-
ent levels of constitutional protection to obscene speech are ineffec-
tive when applied to the Internet.12
43. See Lim, supra note 9, at 301. Secondary publishers have typically operated under a
lesser standard of liability for the material that they transport. Id. The standard of liability is
"know or have reason to know." Id.
44. See Miller, supra note 42 (identifying similarities of Internet services and tele-
phones).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Jason Kay, Note, Sexuality, Live Without a Net: Regulating Obscenity and Ide-
cency on the Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 355, 373 (1995) (comparing similari-
ties of e-mail and actual mail).
49. Miller, supra note 42.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Kim, supra note 1, at 435 (opining that Supreme Court has made distinctions
among media "to confer various levels of constitutional protection to pornographic or indecent
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C. The First Amendment in Cyberspace
The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech. '5 3 However, this right is
not absolute.54 There is no right to engage in obscene speech or
communication; 5 with the caveat that speech, which rises to the level
of indecent, lies within the protection of the First Amendment.5 6
Thus, indecent versus obscene speech is a critical distinction in the
constitutional analysis regarding the protection of free speech.57
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has assumed the
predominant role in determining what constitutes obscene speech,
however, the Justices have debated among themselves the proper ap-
speech"). The Supreme Court believes "the characteristics of new media justify the differ-
ences in the First Amendment standards applied to them." Id.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 571-72 (1942) (opining that "lewd and
obscene speech" is content that lies within "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech"). Justice Murphy, delivering the unanimous opinion, opined obscene speech was
not protected by the Constitution because "[iut has been well-observed that [obscenity is] no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in the com-
munity." Id. at 568, 572; cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 36 (1961) (holding
that state's prohibiting admission to bar because of refusal to answer questions about involve-
ment in communist organizations "does not violate freedom of expression [speech]"). But see
Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 157-58 (asserting that "a requirement of literature or
art conform to some norm prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our sys-
tem"). But cf. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that "I do
not subscribe to the doctrine that permits constitutionally protected rights to be 'balanced'
away when a majority of the Court thinks that a State might have interest sufficient to justify
abridgment of those freedoms").
55. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscene language lies
outside of First Amendment protection).
56. Id. at 487 (holding that an exhibition of sex "in art, literature, scientific works, and
similar forums is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech and press"). Thus, works that involved sex depicted in these described fo-
rums would be indecent and works describing sex in a "manner appealing to prurient interest"
would be labeled obscene and consequently lacking of constitutional protection. See id.
(drawing a distinction between obscenity and sex material [indecency] that is protected by
First Amendment).
57. Indecency is defined as "depictions of sexual or excretory activities or organs."
ACLU v Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 850 (E.D. Pa. 1996) prob.juris. noted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3295
(Dec. 6, 1996) (No. 96-511). The issue of materials being obscene is not precisely defined but
is subject to a three-part test. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (delineating
three part test to be used by a jury when determining if material is obscene). Obscene speech
does receive protection from the First Amendment. Indecent speech does receive constitu-
tional protection but it may be regulated. Because of these subjective definitions and formulas
it is possible that both indecent and obscene speech may be pornographic.
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proach to be taken to define what constitutes obscenity. 8 In 1948,
the Court first ruled, albeit without significant comment, on the con-
stitutionality of legal restraints on obscene speech in Doubleday &
Co. v. New York.59 Doubleday & Co. was charged and found guilty
under a New York criminal obscenity statute for publishing Memoirs
of Hecate County, which contained vivid descriptions of sexual expe-
riences.60 The Supreme Court upheld the obscenity statute in a 4-4
decision without opinion.6 1
In 1957, the next major case involving the issue of obscene
speech, Roth v. United States, reached the Court.6 2 A New York
bookseller was convicted for using the U.S. mail to sell and transport
obscene material.63 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, identi-
fied the key issue as "whether obscenity is utterance within the area
of protected speech and press."64 The Court first held that obscenity
did not reside within the area of constitutionally protected speech,65
then proceeded to distinguish obscene speech from speech that
58. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-705 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (holding that attempts to separate obscene speech from other types of
sexual speech that received First Amendment protection resulted in divergent views
"unmatched in any other course of constitutional adjudication."); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring) (describing difficulty of articulating a clear definition
of obscenity). In describing the difficulty in defining obscenity Justice Stewart stated: "I shall
not today attempt to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [of obscenity]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know when I see it." id.
59. Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) (per curiam).
60. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMRIcAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 907 (2d ed. 1988). The
author of Memoirs of Hecate County was Edmund Wilson, who was one of "Americas fore-
most literary critics." F. Scott Fitzgerald, in relating his respect for Wilson as a critic, called
him "my artistic conscience." F. ScOTr FITZGERALD, PASTING IT TOGETHER, in the Fitzger-
ald Reader 415 (A. Mizener ed. 1963).
61. Doubleday v. New York, 335 U.S. 848, 848 (1948). It seems evident that the Court
avoided the chance to articulate an obscenity definition by issuance of a per curiam decision.
A per curiam opinion is defined as "an opinion of the court in which the judges or justices are
all of one mind and the question involved is so clear that the opinion is not elaborated by an
extension of the supporting reasons." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 932 (3d ed. 1969). It
seems the justices were more in unanimity in being reluctant to articulate a clear definition of
obscenity rather than the book in question being clearly obscene. Justice Frankfurter did not
participate in the decision because he was a close friend of Edmund Wilson. TRIBE, supra note
60.
62. TRIBE, supra note 60, at 908.
63. JoHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1137 (4th ed.
1991).
64. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
65. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
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merely involves sex. 66 The Court formulated the test for identifying
obscene speech as: "whether to the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest." 67 In articulating
this standard, the Court intended to provide lower courts with a guide
by which they could evaluate obscenity.68 Thus, states could not ban
speech unless it satisfied the Roth standard. 69
In the 1966 term, the Court revisited its obscenity formula in A
Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General of Massachusetts ("Memoirs").7 In Memoirs, the
Court overturned the Massachusetts Supreme Court's holding that the
character of the novel was obscene because it appealed to the prurient
interest.71 In so doing, the Memoirs Court expanded its prior defini-
tion in Roth to state that government can only regulate the distribu-
tion of material if it is able to establish three factors:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to a prurient interest in sex;
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contem-
porary community standards relating to the description or representa-
tion of sexual matters; and
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.72
The Memoirs Court's expansion of the obscenity definition is
illustrated in the implementation of "contemporary community stan-
dards" and "redeeming social value" as factors relevant to constitu-
tionality.73 Despite its attempt to create a uniform standard, the test
set forth in Memoirs was never applied with consistency or agreed
upon by a majority of the Court in subsequent cases. 74
66. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63.
67. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. The Court defined prurient as "material having the tendency
to excite lustful thoughts." Id. at 487.
68. Id. at 477.
69. See id. (stating that standards of obscenity are needed to protect freedom of speech),
70. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at
1141 (noting Court was forced to re-examine Roth test in 1966 term).
71. Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
72. Id. at 418.
73. Id. at 418-419. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court but he was only
joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas. The plurality agreed on the result but
sought a different test. Id. at 414.
74. Compare Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-195 (1964) (Brennan, J., Goldberg,
J.) (advocating use of national community standards) with id. at 201-02 (Warren, C.J., Clark, J.
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In Miller v. California, the Court revisited the standards devel-
oped in Roth and Memoirs.75 The Supreme Court in Miller produced
a majority opinion that agreed upon what constitutes obscene and
pornographic material:76
(a) whether the 'average person applying contemporary commu-
nity standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offen-
sive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 77
The relationship between Roth, Memoirs, and Miller lies in the
evolution of the term "utterly worthless. ' 78 In Roth, obscene speech
could be regulated because it was utterly worthless. In Memoirs, ob-
scenity was unprotected if utterly worthless. Finally, in Miller, ob-
scene speech could be regulated even if not utterly worthless.79 The
test delineated in Miller is essentially the modem formula that is used
today to adjudicate obscenity regulation cases. 0
The obscenity doctrine is a product of the Court's attempt to si-
multaneously ensure the rights of adults to view pornography in pri-
vacy while protecting children from the purported harmful affects of
pornography. Congress was mindful of this balancing of adult pri-
dissenting) (arguing for use of local community standards). As a reaction to the variety of
opinions, the Court began in Redrup v. New York to issue per curiam reversals of convictions
for the distribution of obscene materials when "at least five members of the Court, applying
their separate tests, deemed 'the material not to be obscene."' GERALD GUNTHER, CON-
STITtrTONAL LAW 1104 (12th ed. 1991). But see Miller, 413 U.S. 15, 82 n.8 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (noting that Court has only used this [Redrup] approach in 31 cases).
75. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at
1143.
76. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15 (1973).
77. Id. at 24.
78. TRIBE, supra note 60, at 909.
79. See id. (articulating the different definitions of "utterly worthless").
80. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 497 (1987) (holding that "value" of a work under
the Miller test is made by whether a reasonable person could conclude the work in its entirety
has any social value); Ginsburg v. New York, 383 U.S. 463, 463 (1966) (holding that whether
material appeals to a "prurient interest" (lst prong of Miller) can be determined by the method
in which it is advertised); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 153 (1974) (holding that commu-
nity standards [lst prong of Miller] does not have to be statewide); Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115, 115 (1973) (holding that under Miller a book that consists entirely of words can be
obscene): Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 502 (1966) (holding that in determining
"prurient interest", a court may consider a targeted audience).
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vacy rights and protection of minors when it passed the CDA. These
competing issues play a major role when the Supreme Court deter-
mines the constitutional validity of the CDA. The exposure of chil-
dren to pornography is one of the rationales for the creation of the
CDA.81 Stanley v. Georgia8 2 and Ginsberg v. United States 3 provide
illustrations of how the Court applies its obscenity doctrine when ad-
dressing the competing issues of adult privacy and child protection.
As exemplified in Ginsberg, the Court has developed parts of
the obscenity doctrine to give states additional authority in the pro-
tection of minors from pornography. 4 The reason for this additional
authority is that minors are susceptible to coercion to participate in
sexual roles in pornographic pictures and movies. The additional
authority granted to the states is based on the idea that it is dangerous
for minors to be exposed to pornographic materials. 5 In Ginsberg, a
person was convicted for selling nude magazines to a sixteen-year-
old boy.86 The Court upheld the conviction, ruling that a state is al-
lowed to prohibit the distribution of pornographic materials to mi-
nors, even though these materials would not be considered pomo-
graphic if sold to adults.87
Stanley v. Georgia88 also bears a relationship to the CDA. In
Stanley, the Court held that "mere private possession of obscene
matter" by an adult may not be criminal. 9 The Court opined that a
person's right not to have his thoughts controlled outweighed the
right of the state to "protect the individual's mind from the effects of
81. See The Citizen Empowerment Coalition Page, Statement by President Clinton in
reaction to Court Decision (visited Oct. 31, 1996)
<http://www.ciec.org/decisionPA/960612_Clintonstmnt.html> (describing President Clin-
ton's reaction to ACLU v. Reno in which the President stated, "I remain convinced , as I was
when I signed the bill, that our Constitution allows us to help parents by enforcing this Act to
prevent children from being exposed to objectionable material transmitted through computer
networks").
82. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
83. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
84. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 630 (1968) (holding that states have a le-
gitimate interest to regulate obscenity if it concerns well-being of its children residents).
85. Id. at 636.
86, Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 629.
87. See id. (holding that publications are "not obscene for adults and [Ginsberg] is not
barred from selling them to persons 17 years of age or older").
88. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
89. Id. at 568.
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obscenity." 90 However, the Stanley holding has been read very nar-
rowly in subsequent obscenity cases taking place outside of one's
home.91 Thus, Ginsberg and Stanley illustrate the dichotomy of con-
stitutional standards regarding pornography depending on the posses-
sor's age. Through the passage of the CDA, Congress attempted to
appease the opposing, constitutional rights articulated by the Court in
Stanley and Ginsberg.
III. CONmSS INTERvENES: THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF
1996
A. Legislative and Social Impetus
Historically, the government has successfully argued that regu-
lation of obscenity is constitutional if it is designed to protect chil-
dren from "potentially deleterious material." 92 In response to citi-
zens' beliefs that the Internet is saturated with pornography,
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act (CDA).93 The
CDA was created to "ensure that some federal statute prohibits ob-
scenity, and, if possible, even indecency over networked communi-
90. Id. at 565. The Court parallels this rationale by stating "the State may no more pro-
hibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of
homemade spirits." Id. at 567.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Orita, 413 U.S. 139, 139 (1973) (allowing state to prohibit
adults from moving obscene material intended for their private use); United States v. Reidel,
402 U.S. 351, 351 (1971) (affirming that states may proscribe people from receiving pornogra-
phy via mail); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 123 (1973) (permitting
states to prohibit individuals from importing foreign pornographic materials); NOwAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at 1146 (noting Court's refusal to accept argument of pornography
venders that they are merely providing materials for enjoyment by third parties in their private
residences). The Supreme Court has not extended the right to sellers of obscene materials who
argue that they are merely selling obscenity to third-party persons for viewing in their private
homes. Id.
92. See Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastructure,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 43 (1995) (noting that concern over children strengthens govern-
ment's attempts to regulated expression). Professor Cate asserts that the protection of a child's
physical and psychological well-being is a "compelling" government interest. Id. at 46; Jason
Kay, Note, Sexuality, Live Without a Net: Regulating Obscenity and Indecency on the Global
Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 355, 370 (1995) (stating that an argument for regulation is
"to protect minors from potentially deleterious material).
93. See Richard N. Cogiianese, Comment, Sex, Bytes, and Community Entrapment: The
Need for a New Obscenity Standard for the Twenty-First Century, 24 CAP. U. L. REv. 385,
408-09 (1995) (stating that both state and federal legislators have reacted to society's concern
of obscene material on Internet).
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cations." 94 The Communications Decency Act of 1996 was signed
into law by President Clinton on February 8, 1996.95 The CDA was
infused into previous legislation by amending Section 223 of the
Communications Act of 1934.96 Although it addresses a broad range
of communications, it's most controversial section provides jail time
and/or steep fines for persons who intentionally or knowingly pass
obscene or indecent materials to either minors or non-consenting
adults over the Internet.97 Senator Exon, sponsor of the CDA, stated
that the purpose of the CDA was to "assure that the information
highway does not turn into a red light district." 98 The CDA has been
praised for providing protection to children from exposure to pomog-
raphy on the Intemet.99
94. Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A Call for a New Obscenity
Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, 123 (1996).
95. Mike Mills & John Schwartz, Judge Blocks On-Line Smut Law Enforcement: Order
Sparks Confusion OverDefinition, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1996 at B1.
96. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to
be codified in 47 U.S.C. 223 (a)-(h)). The Communications Act of 1934 was amended to in-
clude communication that was "transmitted by means of a telecommunication device".
97. Id.
98. 140 CONG. REC. S9746 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Exon). Senator
Exon attempted to validate the CDA by stating "the information superhighway... will tran-
scend newspapers, radio, and television as an information source ... [t]his is the time to put
some restrictions or guidelines on it." Id. Senator Leahy, in hopes of preserving the develop-
ment of the information superhighway, attempted to pass a competing bill that would refer the
issue of obscenity on the Internet to the Justice Department, who would use current laws (as
opposed to the new CDA) to prosecute violators. 141 CONG. REC. S8330, S8331 (daily ed.
June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Dominic Andreano, Note and Comment, Cyber-
space: How Decent is the Decency Act?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 593, 600 (1996) (criticizing
Senator Exon for his belief that Internet context is similar to broadcast media). Broadcast me-
dia is different because access to it is simple as opposed to the Internet which requires multiple
steps before one can explore the information superhighway. Id.
99. See Hammond, supra note 7, at 281 (stating goal of CDA is to protect children, who
explore Internet, from obscene materials). The concern for children's safety has increased be-
cause of the increasing number of AIDS victims, teenage pregnancies, and sexual abuse of
children. Id.; Cate, supra note 92, at 45 (noting that parents say it is difficult to monitor what
children access on Internet because minors are more computer literate than their adult guardi-
ans); James E. Meadows, The Telecommunications Act of 1996. Rules of the Road for the New
Highways, THE COMPUTER LAW., Mar. 1996, at 1, 8 (noting CDA provisions were enacted to
reduce children's exposure to pornography); Andrew Spett, Comment, A Pig in the Parlor: An
Examination of Legislation Directed at Obscenity and Indecency on the Internet, 26 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 599, 613 (1996) (stating Senator Exon's belief that CDA would enable chil-
dren to be protected from obscenity); Andreano, supra note 98, at 602 (noting that family and
religious groups support the CDA because it attempts to protect children from pornography);
cf. id. (stating that CDA will deter "potential harrassers" from "cluttering up the victim's e-
mail with annoying, unwanted material"). Senator Coats attempted to explain that the CDA,
although restricting access to pornography by children, would not prevent consenting adults
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B. Controversy Over CDA 's Effects and Meaning
The CDA has been subject to extensive criticism and critique
both prior to and after its enactment into law. Before the CDA be-
came law, it received heavy criticism because of its potential to en-
croach on areas of protected speech.100 Senator Daniel Moynihan
commented that "[t]o say that everyone is going to be held to the
standard of my neighbor's seven-year-old is wrong and is going to
cripple the Internet." 101 One of the primary criticisms of the CDA is
that it incorrectly compares the Internet with other types of media.
Thus, critics argue, that the CDA fails to recognize the unique char-
acteristics of the Internet.102 Publishers have criticized the CDA be-
cause its enforcement could classify material as obscene even though
from receiving access to pornography on the computer networks. Id. See McKay, supra note
12, at 479 (describing purposes of CDA). Advocates of the CDA stated that the legislation was
needed to combat obscenity on the Internet because present obscenity regulation does not ac-
count for pornographic images that are downloaded through modems. Id. at 483. Supporters
of the CDA claim that the Act is merely protecting computer users from pornography in the
same way that one is protected when they use the telephone; S. CoNF. REP. No. 104-230, at
[1996 WL 54191) (1996) (arguing that CDA "poses no significant risk to the free-wheeling
and vibrant nature of discourse or to serious, literary, and artistic works that currently can be
found on the Internet").
100. See 141 CoNG. REc. S8386, 8387 (1995) (stating criticisms of CDA before its en-
actment into law). Senator Moniyhan, in commenting on the CDA's purpose of limiting ob-
scenity on the Internet, noted:
[Tihe language of the amendment is too broad, raising serious questions of [sic]
under the first amendment .... [T]he amendment likely makes unlawful on
computers materials that are perfectly lawful in books or letters[;] I suspect the
courts will take a dim view of this provision when it is challenged, which it
surely will be.
Id.; Andreano, supra note 98, at 598 (noting that CDA as amendment to Communications Act
of 1934 is overbroad because CDA attempts to regulate Internet while 1934 Act's purpose is to
protect people from intruding phone calls); cf. David A.J. Richards, Pornography Commis-
sions and the First Amendment: On Constitutional Values and Constitutional Facts, 39 ME. L.
REV. 275, 296 (1987) (advocating that "use of state power to require that any communicative
vocabulary conform to the state's evaluation of its own legitimacy or of legitimate moral val-
ues" constitutes a major threat to constitutional principles).
101. John Schwartz, Making the On-Line Community Safe for Decency and Democracy,
WASH. POST, May 29, 1995, at F17. The Supreme Court, in Sable Communications v. FCC,
noted that "the government may not 'reduce the adult population ... to ... only what is fit for
children." Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (citing Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983); Cate, supra note 92, at 44 (asserting that gov-
enment is not constitutionally permitted to regulate material by forcing "adults to reading
'only what is fit for children'"); Ryga, supra note 5, at 242 (noting that Electronic Frontier
Foundation has condemned CDA because it "restricts adults in public fora to 'writing and
reading only such content as is suitable to children"').
102. See Andreano, supra note 98, at 601 (saying comparison of Internet with harassing
telephone call is implausible argument).
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if the same information was published in different media contexts, it
would be protected by the First Amendment. 10 3
The CDA has been denounced by others who believe punish-
ment by imprisonment is too severe for using obscene language on
the Internet. 04 In an attempt to minimize the necessity of the CDA,
many of its opponents have advocated the use of computer software
censoring applications.05
In conclusion, the flaws of the CDA censors otherwise constitu-
tionally protected speech and the punishments [imprisonment] have
no correlation to the crime committed [transmission of obscene lan-
guage]. In other words, the punishment does not fit the crime.
C. Judicial Interpretation: Unconstitutional, but for Different
Reasons
1. ACLUv. Reno
Two cases, ACLU v. Reno 06 and Shea v. Reno,107 have chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the CDA. In ACLU, a collection of
103. See Filtering News, NAT'- L.J. Apr. 17, 1995, at A20 (discussing liabilities of pub-
lished articles disseminated on Internet). The National Law Journal provides an example to
explain their assertion by stating that: "trial testimony often contains passages that, taken out
of text, could be classified as 'obscene."' Id. Thus, publications would be in the odd position
of being able to distribute materials on paper via sidewalk newsstands, yet be put at risk for
posting the very same material via the Internet. Id.
104. The opposition to jail time is exemplified in a House of Representative's companion
bill which excluded jail as a form of punishment for violating the CDA. H.R. 1555, 104th
Cong. (1995). Even the Justice Department, which is directed by the defendant in ACLU v.
Reno and Shea v. Reno, admitted that the CDA will "criminalize constitutionally protected
speech." Schwartz, supra note 101.
105. See Kevin Maney, Tuning into Telecom Reform: Big Picture is Filled with New Op-
tions, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 1995, at 63 (discussing need of Internet industry to offer devices
for obscenity regulation). The House of Representatives tried to prevent jail-time punishment
by attempting to persuade the Internet industry to aggressively advertise and promote their
software devices that shielded Internet users from obscenity. Id.; Cate, supra note 92, at 45
(noting that technology used for intellectual property protection can be used to control minor's
access on Internet). But cf. id. (arguing that courts will not investigate "availability of reme-
dial steps" [self-censorship] when examining obscenity regulation in Internet context); Ryga,
supra note 5, at 248 (discussing available content regulation software programs available from
Internet industry). Ms. Ryga points out that there are many computer software programs that
can adequately assist parents in regulating what their children may see while exploring the
Internet. Id. Ms. Ryga also advocates the implementation of a ratings system for material on
the Internet. Id. at 249.
106. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa 1996), affd, Reno v. ACLU, 117
S.Ct. 2329 (1997) (holding that Section 223 violated First Amendment).
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educational organizations, businesses, and not-for-profit organiza-
tions filed suit against the Department of Justice in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, challenging
provisions of the CDA that censored non-obscene and non-child por-
nography over the Internet.' 08 The plaintiffs specifically challenged
two provisions of § 502 of the CDA, which outlawed indecent'09 and
patently offensive10 speech on the Internet, claiming that the provi-
sions were constitutionally overbroad and vague. Both of these pro-
visions can "subject violators to substantial penalties" including
fines and imprisonment for a maximum of two years."'
In ACLU v. Reno, the Pennsylvania District Court" 2 first wres-
tled with the applicable standard of review." 3 The court determined
strict scrutiny to be the appropriate standard because "the CDA is
patently a government-imposed content-based restriction on
speech."" 4 Strict scrutiny requires that there be a compelling gov-
ernment interest to implement the CDA in which the means by which
the statute is implemented are narrowly tailored."5 In order for the
provisions in question to be upheld as constitutional, the benefit
gained by a content-based restriction "must outweigh the loss of con-
stitutionally protected rights."" 6 The court explained that strict
scrutiny was proper because the unique characteristics of the Internet
were more closely related to the telephone media rather than the
107. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), afl'd, Reno v. Shea, 117 S.Ct.
2501 (1997) (holding that Section 223 was overbroad because it banned constitutionally pro-
tected speech that occurs between adults).
108. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 824. At the outset of the case, the plaintiffs empha-
sized they were not challenging the regulation of material that was deemed to be obscene or
child pornography because both of these groups are excepted from protection by the First
Amendment. Id. at 853.
109. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 1994, Supp. 1997).
110. Id.
I11. Id.
112. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223. If action was taken to challenge the constitutionality of the CDA,
Section 561 calls for a judicial review consisting of a panel of three judges. Id. A subsequent
appellate review, bestows upon the parties involved, a right to directly appeal their case to the
Supreme Court. Id. At this time, the Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction for ACLU
but has not decided on the Department of Justice's petition for certiorari regarding Shea.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), Aft'd, Reno v. ACLU, 115 S.Ct. 2329
(1997); Sheav. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), Aft'd, Reno v. Shea, 115 S.Ct. 1501
(1997).
113. ACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851.
114. Id. at 851.
115. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
116. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976)).
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broadcast media."t 7 The essential reason for this comparison is that
users of both the telephone and the Internet must "act affirmatively
and deliberately to retrieve specific information on-line." 8 This re-
quirement is distinguishable from the broadcast media, because users
in the broadcast media context play a passive role in the communica-
tion process. 19
The court acknowledged that the government has a compelling
government interest in preventing minors from viewing either ob-
scene or indecent material when exploring the information super-
highway.120 However, the district court cited the Supreme Court
stating that "if the means it [government] has chosen sweeps more
broadly than necessary and thereby chills the expression of adults, it
has overstepped onto rights protected by the First Amendment.' 21
In order to explain its vagueness holding, the ACLU court provided
examples to illustrate the detrimental effects of the CDA. 22 The
court hypothesized situations where topics such as AIDS and rape,
which are unequivocally important issues to teens, would be sanc-
tioned by the CDA as indecent, and therefore, prohibited material on
the Internet.'23 Because the vagueness of the CDA swallowed speech
that was not only protected by the First Amendment, but also benefi-
cial to society, the CDA was not "narrowly tailored" to meet the
government's objective. The vagueness lies in the fact that Internet
users have no guidelines on which to determine if their communica-
tions would violate the CDA. However, the court concluded that the
CDA reached areas of adult-protected speech and, as a result, for-
117. Id. The broadcast media receives the least constitutional protection because of its
pervasive presence in people's lives. Broadcast media can easily reach children by way of
turning on the television or radio. Therefore, regulation becomes more strict and the only pos-
sible way to limit material in the broadcast media is to "place restraints on its transmission.
See Miller, supra note 42, at 1151 (discussing how characteristics of broadcast media influ-
enced the Pacifica decision). While the broadcast media fails to "provide the recipient" with
"no meaningful opportunity to avoid" its transmission, the telephone media necessitates a
more relaxed method of regulation because it requires the receiver of the communication to
take affirmative actions to receive the information. Id. In conclusion, it seems that the court in
ACLU decided the telephone was a more appropriate media metaphor to the Internet because
both communication devices require affirmative action as opposed to the passive recipient be-
havior seen in the broadcast media.
118. Miller, supra note 42, at 1151.
119. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 851.
120. Id. at 854.
121. Id. (quoting Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989)).
122. Id. at 853.
123. Id.
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feited any chance of being a constitutionally viable "means" of
achieving its compelling governmental interest. 124
2. Shea v. Reno
In Shea v. Reno, a publisher of an on-line magazine filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against the Justice Department to enjoin the enforcement of the
CDA. Shea claimed § 223(d) of the CDA, which outlawed the
transmittal of patently offensive speech, was unconstitutional because
it restricted areas of protected speech.125 The Shea court agreed with
the ACLU court and ruled that strict scrutiny should be the proper
standard of review since § 223(d) involved a "content-based regula-
tion of speech."1 26 Plaintiff, Shea put forth two arguments in his
claim that § 223(d) restricted protected speech:127 first, the CDA
reached an area of speech "with serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value and that the government cannot demonstrate any
compelling interest" to abrogate the free speech rights associated
therewith,1 28 and second, that the CDA was not narrowly tailored be-
cause "it fail[ed] to preserve for adults the ability to engage in certain
constitutionally protected communication."' 129 The district court,
however, refused to address the first argument. 13 0  The Shea court,
like the ACLU court, assumed that the government possessed a com-
pelling interest in "restricting minors access to all 'patently offen-
sive' material."'' Having satisfied this element, the court then fo-
cused its examination on whether § 223(d) was narrowly tailored to
achieve this compelling government interest. 3 2 The government
conceded and the court agreed that § 223(d) was unconstitutional on
its face.133 However, § 223(d) is accompanied by § 223(e), which
124. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854.
125. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 916.
126. Id. at 939.
127. Id. at 940.
128. Id. The court found it unnecessary to address Shea's first argument because it held
that regardless of the value of the material censored by the CDA, the Act was an obvious
"broad restraint on protected communication between adults." Id.
129. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940.
130. Id.
131. Id.at941.
132. Id. The court explained that the benefit of preventing minors access to indecent
speech does outweigh the burden of restricting free speech rights of adults. Id. at 941.
133. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 941.
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provides affirmative defenses. The government asserted that the af-
firmative defenses in § 223(e), when paired with § 223(d), enable the
CDA to be a constitutionally viable means of protecting minors from
indecent material while allowing adults to "transmit constitutionally
protected communications to adults."' 134 The CDA's affirmative de-
fenses provide that a person has not violated the CDA if he or she is
able to prove:
(1) that he or she has in good faith, taken reasonable measures to
prevent minors from accessing indecent material, and
(2) he or she has restricted access to [covered] communica-
tion[s] by requiring the use of a verified credit card, debit account,
adult access code, or adult personal identification number.135
The court rejected this argument, by holding that the affirmative
defenses, coupled with § 223 (d), were not "narrowly tailored to
achieve the government's interest in restricting minors access to in-
decent material" because available technology provided "no feasible
means for most content providers to avail themselves of the two af-
firmative defenses."1 36
Although both ACLU and Shea agree that § 223(d) is overbroad
because it acts as a "ban on constitutionally protected indecent com-
munication between adults,' 1 37 the two courts are in disagreement as
to whether § 223(d) is constitutionally vague - ACLU holds it to be
vague whereas Shea does not. The void-for-vagueness doctrine re-
quires all criminal laws to provide notice to the public that identifies
those activities that are considered criminal by the statute in ques-
tion.138 In order for free-speech legislation to survive a vagueness
challenge, it must be tailored to the least-restrictive means of regu-
lating free speech. 39
The difference in judicial opinions between ACLU and Shea fo-
cuses on the distinctions in the definition of indecency. In ACLU, the
court concluded that the CDA's definition of indecency is vague be-
cause it fails to explain the community standards for the medium in
question -the Internet. 14 In Shea, the court concluded that no
134. Id. at 941-42.
135. Id. at 942.
136. Id. at 951.
137. Id.
138. NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at 950.
139. Id. at 952.
140. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 862-63.
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available authority required statutes to define indecency according to
the community standards of the medium in question. 14' Thus, the
judges in Shea concluded that the lack of a medium-specific refer-
ence in the definition of indecency in § 223(d) does not render the
statute unconstitutionally vague. 42
D. The Supreme Court Protects Free Speech on the Internet
The Supreme Court term that ended June 1997 was one of the
most noteworthy terms in recent years. 14 Arguably one of its most
important decision was its ruling concerning free speech on the Inter-
net. 44 In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court affinred the lower
court's decision in favor of the ACLU and other free speech advo-
cates. 45 The Supreme Court began its decision by summarizing the
relevant and stipulated facts concerning the Internet, sexually explicit
material, and age verification. 46 The Court then briefly described the
Communications Decency Act and the prior judicial history of the
case.
147
In its argument for reversal, the petitioner presented three prior
decisions that they believed would uphold the constitutionality of the
CDA. 48 The Court distinguished the CDA from its upholding of the
statute in Ginsberg v. New York because the Ginsberg statute applied
only to commercial transactions, allowed parents to make the deci-
sion on what their children could read, and lastly, that the wording of
the statute adequately defined what is "indecent." 149 In contrast, the
Court held that the CDA was limitless in its application, encroached
on a parent's right to decide what his or her children could view on
141. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 938.
142. Id.
143. See Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of Justice: Supreme Court Lays Down New
Standards, SAN ANTONIO ExPESs-NEws, July 20, 1997, at 1J (labeling Court session as an
"intellectual feast"); David G. Savage, Supreme Spree: Court Decides Everything from Feder-
alism to the Internet, A.B.A. J., August 1997, at 40 (describing Court as "front page news").
144. See Savage, supra note 143 (opining that the Internet free speech case was the high-
light of the Courts term).
145. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329,2351 (1997).
146. Id. at 2334.
147. Id. at 2337-42.
148. Id. at 2341.
149. Id. at2341. (Ginsbergv. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
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the Internet, and failed to define "indecent" and "patently offen-
sive." 50
In its response to petitioner's argument that FCC v. Pacifica
supports upholding the CDA, the Supreme Court noted that the
CDA's all-encompassing prohibitions were "not dependent on any
agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet" and
that unlike the radio, the Internet did not have history of government
regulation.' 5'
Finally, the Supreme Court dismissed any similarities between
the CDA and the statute in Renton v. Playtime Theatres 52 by decid-
ing that the CDA was a "content-based blanket restriction on
speech" and thus could not be analyzed with Renton, which involved
a "time, place, and manner regulation."' 53 The Supreme Court
opined that that these three cases actually heightened the constitu-
tional concerns of the CDA.154
In addressing the unique characteristics of the Internet, the Su-
preme Court stated that because mediums are different, they each re-
quire different levels of regulation. 55 Justice Stevens distinguished
the Internet from other communication mediums such as radio and
television by noting that the Internet does not have a history of regu-
lation, is limitless in terms of available frequencies and does not pos-
sess an invasive nature.156 The Court then went on to discuss the
vagueness of the CDA provisions. 57 The Supreme Court points out
the CDA's lack of explanation and inconsistent use of the words
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2342. (FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
152. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 474 U.S. 41 (1986).
153. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. at 2343-44 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
46 (1986)).
154. Id. at 2341.
155. Id. at 2343 (recognizing that "[e]ach medium of expression... may present its own
problems") (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975)).
156. Id. at 2343-44.
157. Id. at 2344-45 (indicating concern for vagueness of the CDA because it provides
criminal penalties for violations and its "obvious chilling affect on free speech"). The Court
also stated that even though a statute is enacted to protect children from sexually explicit mate-
rials, one must still engage in a First Amendment inquiry of the statute. Id. at 2346. The
power of the government to protect children from obscene speech shall not occur unchecked
and this power must yield to the right of adults to engage in protected speech. Id. at 2346-47.
The Court explained this assertion by providing examples of speech that may be sexual in na-
ture but not obscene or pornographic. Id. Some example are discussions on the Internet con-
cering AIDS and birth control.
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"indecent" and "patently offensive."' 58 The Court reasons that these
discrepancies fail to provide Internet users with any kind of standard
in which to base their communications in cyberspace. 159 The CDA is
then compared with the Miller obscenity standard and the Court ex-
plains that the CDA is unconstitutional because its provisions apply
to activities beyond "sexual conduct" such as "organs" and
"excretory activities." 160 More importantly, the Court points out that
the prohibited speech in the CDA can be compared to any
"applicable state law."161 Thus, the paramount flaw of the CDA ex-
posed by the Court is that it is impossible to determine a local com-
munity standard in cyberspace.
The remaining portions of the Court's analysis focus on the af-
firmative defenses in the CDA. The first proffered defense brought
forth by the petitioner is that the Internet users can "tag" their com-
munications so others with appropriate software could block their re-
ception. 62 The Court dismisses this defense by noting that this type
of software product does not even exist in the marketplace. 163 The
second and third defenses are that an information provider can re-
quire verification, via credit cards, before allowing that person to
download his information. 164 Although verification software is avail-
able on the market, the Supreme Court noted that it is only affordable
to commercial providers, and thus unfairly suppresses the speech of
non-commercial providers. 65 In its conclusion, the Supreme Court
noted that it was concerned that the CDA would stunt the explosive
growth of the Internet.' 66 Based on history, the Supreme Court stated
that government regulation is more likely to "interfere with the free
exchange of ideas" and that freedom of expression outweighs "any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship."1 67
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
158. Id. at 2344.
159. ACLU, 115 S.Ct. at 2344.
160. Id. at 2345.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2349.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2352.
167. Id.
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A. The Obscenity Doctrine
1. Is It Time to Abandon the Obscenity Exception?
Due to the difficulties of applying current obscenity standards to
material in cyberspace, some commentators, as well as a former Su-
preme Court Justice, have proposed abandoning the obscenity excep-
tion to free speech. 168 This is not an altogether new proposal. One of
the most influential Supreme Court justices had long advocated the
abolition of the obscenity exceptions.169 Two primary arguments
provide the impetus for abdicating the obscenity exceptions. First,
throughout history, there has been a liberal interpretation of the First
Amendment, including the protection of obscenity °70 Second, and
perhaps more importantly, is that critics of the obscenity exception to
free speech argue that juries are unable to decide what constitutes lo-
cal or national standards. 71 This indecisiveness on the part of juries
arises because the Court has been unable to provide a clear and pre-
cise definition of obscenity. Due to the inherent vagueness in the
definition of obscenity, it is seemingly impossible to establish a uni-
formly applicable standard by which to judge obscene material.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever abandon
the obscenity exception to free speech, despite its "'somewhat tor-
tured history' in dealing with obscenity cases."' 72 Although the
168. Huelster, supra note 2, at 882.
169. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissenting)
(arguing that the First Amendment should protect obscenity); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
40-47 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (asserting that restraints of free speech such as the ob-
scenity exception, should be promulgated not by judicial activism, but by constitutional
amendment"). But see Huelster, supra note 2, at 883 (discussing abolition of obscenity ex-
ception to First Amendment protection). However, the exoneration of the obscenity exception
from free speech seems an implausible scenario because it would require the Court to
"overturn decades of juisprudence exempting obscenity from First Amendment protection to
make such a decision." Id.
170. See Coglianese, supra note 13, at 414 (noting that Thomas Jefferson criticized any
form of censorship and that Benjamin Franklin composed sexually-explicit materials).
171. See Chiu, supra note 8, at 212 (noting optimism of idea that juries can decipher stan-
dard to be used in adjudicating obscenity).
172. Id. at 212; see Lim, supra note 9, at 318 (discussing difficulties of regulating Inter-
net). Internet experts have concluded that any type of censorship on the information super-
highway is an unrealistic goal. Id.; Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers:
Cybersexual Possibilities, 83 GEO. L.J. 1969, 1980 (1995) (noting censorship and prosecution
as unsuccessful attempts at obscenity regulation). The author notes the futility of obscenity
regulation on the Internet by arguing whether "[i]n this time of deficit anxiety and social and
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members of the Court have vigorously debated "the standards for
judging" obscenity, they have rarely disagreed that obscene material
is excepted from First Amendment protection. 173
2. A New Obscenity Test Tailored to the Internet
Because of the global nature of communication on the Internet,
the local community-standards test enunciated in Miller is ill-suited
to apply to obscenity regulation on the information superhighway.
Therefore, some commentators have advocated the implementation
of dicta from Stanley v. Georgia'74 as a means of addressing the
unique issues raised by Internet regulation. 75 In Stanley, the Su-
preme Court held that the government could not regulate obscenity if
it is viewed in the privacy of one's home. 76 Thus, the analogy can be
drawn between the viewing of obscene materials, such as books or
movies in the home with the exploration of obscenity on the Internet
in a person's private residence.7 7 Under this proposal, the viewing of
pornography in a public computer forum, such as a university com-
puter lab, would be prohibited. A person using his own laptop com-
puter could also be prevented from viewing pornography on the In-
ternet if this activity occurred in public areas such as airport
terminals or shopping malls.
The weakness in using Stanley as a basis for regulating obscen-
ity in cyberspace is that the Supreme Court has refused to protect any
avenues that are used to bring pornography into one's home. 178 How-
public service cut-backs, does it make sense to devote more energy and resources to develop-
ing ways to block access to cyberpom or to investigating and prosecuting its purveyors?" Id.
173. See Meyer, supra note 172, at 1980 (noting Court's disagreement on obscenity stan-
dard instead of non-existence of obscenity).
174. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
175. See Coglianese, supra note 13, at 419 (advocating that "only acceptable solution for
erotica on BBS is for Supreme Court to breath new life into Stanley"). Coglianese notes that
regulating obscenity on the Internet under the Miller standard permits the government to de-
cide what a person can see on the Internet while in the privacy of his or her home. Id. at 420.
176. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
177. See Eric C. Jensen, Comment, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards
and the First Amendment, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 235 (1987) (noting that physically, BBS
users are "within the protected 'home' zone of privacy").
178. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 557 (failing to extend protection beyond one's
personal residence). In Stanley, the Supreme Court noted that its holding "does not require
that we fashion or recognize a constitutional right... to distribute or sell obscene materials."
Id. at 356; U.S. v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 351 (1971) (upholding conviction for mailing obscene
materials to consenting adults); U.S. v. Twelve 200-Foot Reels, 413 U.S. 351, 351 (1973)
(refusing to recognize right to import obscene materials for one's personal use); Paris Adult
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ever, the Court has yet to rule on whether the government can crimi-
nalize transportation of obscenity between adults while both of them
are residing in their homes. 79 One can criticize the Court for its nar-
row holding in Stanley because it is illogical that one can possess and
view obscenity in a private abode, but the supplying of such obsceni-
ties to consenting adults is illegal.8 0 Perhaps it is time for the Su-
preme Court to broaden its holding in Stanley in order to re-ignite
and bring to life its statement that "the Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas."''
3. Local vs. National Community Standard
The Court in Miller v. California held that "obscenity is to be
determined by applying "contemporary community standards."'8 2
The issue of community standards has caused much constitutional
debate. 83 The Court has defined contemporary as meaning local.184
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 49 (1973) (stating that there is no right to show obscene mate-
rials to consenting adults).
179. See Burke, supra note 4, at 107 (arguing that certain forms of Internet communica-
tion are similar to actual communications taking place in one's private residence). It is possi-
ble that certain types of Internet communication could be "analogized to a virtual living room
in a person's home." Id.; Valkenburg, supra note 1, at 327 (asserting that because download-
ing occurs in one's residence, government is limited in its ability to prohibit what is down-
loaded). But see Kay, supra note 48, at 381 (noting that "while a person's disk drive on his or
her computer is analogous to his or her home library, connecting to a network such as the In-
temet could be seen as analogous to 'leaving' the zone of privacy to enter a public space").
180. See Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (illustrating constitutional inconsistencies of allowing one to possess obscenity
but making it criminal to "providing another with material he has a constitutional right to pos-
sess"). Justice Black criticized the post-Stanley holdings by writing that "Stanley would only
be good law 'when a man writes salacious books in his attic, prints them in his basement, and
reads them in his living room."' United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,
382 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting). The rationale for allowing regulation of obscenity outside
of the home is found in the state's regulatory power. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 63, at
1146.
181. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564.
182. Millerv. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
183. See Burke, supra note 4, at 109 (criticizing Supreme Court for refusal to provide uni-
form obscenity guidelines). The debate is exemplified in the variety of community definitions
articulated throughout the United States. Id.; Coglianese, supra note 13, at 417 (noting spec-
trum of community definitions). But see Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 (stating that "[ilt is neither
realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people in
Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New
York City"). The Court acknowledged that different results in different areas does create a
compromise of constitutional rights. Id. at 26 n.9 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
184. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (discussing heterogeneous characteristics of Nation).
Chief Justice Burger, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated: "[o]ur Nation is simply too
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In the past, the Court has applied its community standard definition
of obscenity to cases involving telephones, radio, print, broadcast
television, and cable - media that are quite dissimilar to the Inter-
net. 185 Does the community standards test adequately address ob-
scenity claims stemming from the information superhighway, which
has no readily identifiable community? 186
When establishing "community standards," courts are prohib-
ited from infringing upon any "area of expression that is protected by
the [fjederal Constitution."' 18 7 Local community standards are inade-
quate when addressing obscenity in mediums other than the Internet
because the test erroneously assumes that all "local" communities
are homogenous 88 This flaw is magnified when the local commu-
big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated
for all 50 states in a single formulation." Id. But see Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
303 (1977) (indicating that community standards "is not one that can be defined legisla-
tively"). The Court in Miller allowed a state to define community as opposed to a national
standard. Huelster, supra note 2, at 874-75. However, the Court in Hamling v. United States
upheld jury instructions that allowed "occasional references to the community of the 'nation as
a whole.' Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974).
185. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 15 (involving mailing of unsolicited sexually explicit mate-
rial), Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 153 (1974) (concerning exhibition of pornographic
motion picture); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 291 (1977) (regarding mailing of ob-
scene materials); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 726 (1978) (adjudicating a prere-
corded monologue broadcast over radio); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. at 115
(concerning "Dial-a-Por" telephone service).
186. See Huelster, supra note 2, at 876 (noting that some commentators believe that users
of a BBS form a potentially international community because anybody in the world can access
BBS); Burke, supra note 4, at 111 (asserting that community standards are irrelevant in cyber-
space because there are no geographical boundaries).
187. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964). The Court opines that it is illogical to
allow states to tailor their obscenity standards locally, when federal law should possess a na-
tional characteristic and thus, be consistent throughout the United States. Id. This seems even
more evident in regards to the Internet because the Internet does not possess any regional char-
acteristics. See id. at 184 (noting absurdity of local community standards because "this is a
national constitution we are expounding"). See generally Coglianese, supra note 13, at 418
(stating that "local standards" test violates Bill of Rights because it allows a majority least
tolerant community] to impose it values on acceptable speech on minorities [more tolerant
community]).
188. Smith v .United States, 431 U.S. 291, 313-14 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens argued that "diversity within the Nation which makes a single standard of obscenity
applies equally to the use of local or state standards." Id. at 313-14. Sergent, supra note 4, at
700 (noting difficulties of local community standard test). The local community standards test
has been criticized because it mistakenly assumes that a community is "a definable territory
containing a collection of relatively homogenous individuals with common interests in polic-
ing the sexual morality of the neighborhood". Id.; Shiff, supra note 1, at 745 (arguing that
local standards are "just as hypothetical and unascertainable as a national standard); cf. Huel-
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nity standard test is used in the Internet context, as illustrated in
United States v. Thomas. 89
In Thomas, a San Francisco couple was convicted for violating
federal obscenity statutes.190 The couple, Mr and Mrs. Thomas, had
set up a pornographic BBS in their Bay Area home. 191 A postal in-
spector paid for and downloaded pornographic images to a computer
terminal located in Memphis, Tennessee. 92 Rather then being tried
in San Francisco, they were tried and convicted in Memphis, where
the postal inspector downloaded the images. 193 The pornography at
issue in Thomas would have been protected as "indecent" speech in
San Francisco but was considered unprotected and "obscene" speech
in Memphis. 94 The Sixth Circuit upheld the couple's conviction by
holding that it was permissible to prosecute obscenity cases at the
place where the downloading computer terminal was located or the
place where the images were downloaded from. 95 In essence, the
judge was giving zealous prosecutors freedom to choose the commu-
nity standard that "holds true in the most conservative jurisdic-
ster, supra note 2, at 876 (suggesting that regardless of type of community instructions given,
jurors usually decide cases based on their morals, regardless of their residing community).
189. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 701 (6th Cir. 1995); see Huelster, supra note
2, at 877 (stating that courts have to decide "which party's community standard the jury
should apply to determine whether materials are obscene"); Ryga, supra note 5, at 250
(predicting that courts will conclude that local community standard does not work on informa-
tion superhighway). The difficulty lies in choosing the community out of: the place where the
person downloaded the pornography, the place where the pornography was downloaded from,
or the place where the BBS operator is located. Id.; McKay, supra note 12, at 487 (noting that
critics of CDA believed using community standards to address Internet pornography may be
difficult.) The critics contend a hardship exists because cyberspace lies outside any traditional
geographic boundaries and that cyberspace itself is an entire community unto itself. Id. The
locality of the community could be describe as a virtual community.; Coglianese, supra note
13, at 415 (stating that the Internet does not fall in traditional sense of community). For exam-
ple, a person in Las Vegas can post pornography on his BBS. People in Milwaukee can then
download this pornography on their computers located in Wisconsin. It is possible that the
pornography when viewed in Las Vegas could be seen as indecent, and thus protected as free
speech. But in Milwaukee, the pornography could be seen as obscene, and thus would not
protected as free speech.
190. U.S. v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,706 (6th Cir. 1996).
191. Id. at 705.
192. Id.
193. See, Jeffrey E. Faucette, Note, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Ob-
scenity Doctrine and a Frightened University's Censorship of Sex on the hIternet, 44 DUKE
L.J. 1155, 1167 (1995) (stating that people using traditional methods to distribute pornography
can avoid shipping their materials to communities where they could face prosecution).
194. See Thonias, 74 F.3d at 711 (stating that access to Thomas's' BBS was available to
communities that were less tolerant of obscenity).
195. Id. at 716.
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tion." 196 This statement by the court implies that there is really no
such thing as "community standards," but rather a choice of com-
munities depending on which community the prosecutor perceived to
be the least tolerant of obscene material. 197 This decision illustrates
the inequity of local standards in cyberspace. 198 The use of local
community standards in determining obscenity on the information
superhighway will encourage forum shopping, as seen in Thomas.199
Another flaw in using community standards on the Internet is
that it will ignore one of the assumptions used in Miller.200 The as-
196. Faucette, supra note 193, at 1169.
197. See J. Todd Metcalf, Note, Obscenity Prosecutions in Cyberspace: The Miller Test
Cannot "Go Where No [Porn] Has Gone Before", 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 481, 500-01 (1996)
(noting that difference in venue could result in bankruptcy or imprisonment in one place and
acquittal in another).
198. See Burke, supra note 4, at 110-11 (arguing that local community test forces people
to tailor their products so as not to violate strict, conservative standards). The unfairness is in
the imposition of "the lowest common denominator approach, whereby distributors market
only material that conforms to the standards of the most sensitive community - a conformity
that chills protected speech." Id.; Burke, supra at 112 (noting that person can access Internet
pornography even without BBS' operator's knowledge). Thus, the BBS cannot block access
even if he or she "was able to accurately predict whether or not standards of the geographic
community from which the call originated would be violated." Id. Some commentators have
argued that not only the receiver or disseminator of the BBS in question forms two choice of
communities but that because a BBS can be accessed from all over the world, the community
is in essence a global one. Id.; Huelster, supra note 2, at 876 (noting that entire group of BBS
users form community). Assume that the postal worker from Memphis travels to San Fran-
cisco and purchases the pornography from the Thomas' adult-book store. The postal worker
than returns home to Memphis with his nude magazines in hand. In this case, the postal
worker would be in possession of and responsible for bringing in materials that according to
local, Memphis community standards were obscene and thus not protected as free speech. In
this case, it seems logical not only to prosecute the postal inspector, not Mr. and Mrs. Thomas,
and also to prosecute in Memphis, rather than San Francisco. This hypothetical can accurately
be compared to the facts in the actual Thomas case. Mr. and Mrs. Thomas provided an elec-
tronic bookstore a.k.a. BBS. The postal worker rather than flying to San Francisco, electroni-
cally visited the City by the Bay via his computer and modem and obtained pornography. In-
stead of physically bringing back the pornographic sources, the postal worker downloaded the
pornography on his computer. It seems that Mr. and Mrs. Thomas could only violate the local
standards in Memphis, if they operated their pornography service in Memphis, whether it be a
bookstore or a BBS. In reality, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas, operated this service in a community
that found there literature to be indecent and not obscene.
199. Shiff, supra note 1, at 746. Local standards will give prosecutors the ability to
switch from either the BBS site or the downloading computer terminal site, depending on
which local area has a more conservative standard regarding what is obscenity. Id. It seems
very possible that if the downloading computer was in San Francisco and the BBS terminal
was in Memphis, that the prosecutors would not pick the downloading terminal but rather the
BBS terminal because it is located in a more conservative community.
200. See Shiff, supra note 1, at 748 (explaining physical differences between information
transmitted through Internet and mails).
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sumption being that children or non-consenting adults could be af-
fronted by the physical presence of pornography.201 In Miller, the
Court articulated the community standards test to allow such com-
munities to protect themselves. However, people cannot be con-
fronted by pornography when it is traveling in cyberspace. Unlike
the mail, bookstores, or movie theaters, which have the potential to
exhibit obscenity to an unwilling or underage public, the transmission
of obscenity over the Internet is merely "electrical impulses requir-
ing computer software to decode them. '202 Allowing local commu-
nity standards to be used in obscenity regulation on the Internet will
unfairly force a BBS to monitor the possibly millions of locations
that can access their BBS.20 3 This unjust activity will result in BBS
operators incurring major costs for "acquiring the sophisticated tech-
nology necessary to determine what information each subscriber re-
quests, and from what location he accesses it.' ' 204 Rather than going
to these financial extremes to ensure the legality of one's BBS, it
seems possible that the number of available BBSs will decline dra-
matically. Regardless of whether BBS operators are punished finan-
cially by being required to set up extensive monitor systems, BBS
operators will be forced to tailor their sites to the "most sensitive or
puritanical locality. ' 205 This is unconstitutional because it would
permit a community to suffocate types of speech that would be per-
201. See Shiff, supra note 1, at 748 (noting that local standards test would allow commu-
nities to "insulate themselves from such materials); Kim, supra note 1, at 442 (advocating
governmental interest in protecting non-consenting recipients of pornography because there are
no "'unwilling recipients' exposed to such material").
202. Shiff, supra note 1, at 748.
203. See Huelster, supra note 2, at 878 (noting the great burden of requiring BBS opera-
tors to monitor all possible sites that could access their service).
204. Id. This result is precisely what the ACLU court found to be an impermissible bur-
den when it considered the available affirmative defenses. Compare ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp 824, 855 (finding that "defenses are not technologically or economically feasible for
most providers), with Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989) (stating that
dial-a-pom telephone services "may be forced to incur some costs in developing and imple-
menting a system for screening ... and there is no constitutional impediment to enacting a law
which may impose such costs on a medium providing these messages").
205. Sergent, supra note 4, at 701; see Huelster, supra note 2, at 878-79 (discussing con-
sequences of developing a BBS for least tolerant communities). Tailoring the BBS to the most
conservative community will result in maintaining obscenity standards for locales that in all
honesty will probably never access the BBS site. Id. The imposition of the most conservative
community standards dictating to the rest of the country what is obscene has been chastised
because "it is futile to have each Hamlet in the country decide what it finds acceptable on the
Internet and resolve the question in favor of the most repressive answer." Coglianese, supra
note 2, at 417.
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miffed by either the Constitution or more tolerant communities. 206
This result would indirectly stunt the growth of the Internet and pre-
vent people from exercising their right to speak on topics that would
be constitutionally permissible in other mediums. The arrival of the
Internet as the future's chief mode of communication may force the
Court to abandon the community rule set forth in Miller.20 7
Some have advocated not an abandonment of community stan-
dards, but rather a move to a national standard, as an attempt to ac-
commodate the pervasively national aspects of the Internet.208 How-
ever, commentators are reluctant to endorse a national standard
because of the concern that people will be forced to accept materials
they deem obscene, and it is also feared that the most conservative
opinion of obscenity will determine what is obscene for the entire
nation.209
Both before and after Miller, some members of the Court have
supported use of a national standard to determine whether speech is
obscene.210 As well, numerous commentators have advocated the
206. See Huelster, supra, note 2, at 878 (arguing that expensive censoring systems will
force BBS service out of a market).
207. See Chiu, supra note 8, at 209 (noting that the Miller test was designed to address
small rural communities). The author suggests a more national standard because these same
communities now receive a pervasive national influence due to the information superhighway.
Id.
208. See Lim, supra note 9, at 321 (positing that national standard will aid the individual
BBS operator who does not possess the resources to investigate multitude of local community
standards that currently exist); Chiu, supra note 8, at 210 (stating that information superhigh-
way has created world where "no community exists as an island unto itself, able to maintain its
own set of morals completely separate from those of other communities"). Commentators
have argued that, in designing a national standard, courts should follow the standard of the
most tolerant community. Id. However, this approach is flawed in the same way as a national
standard following the least tolerant community because both ways will subjectively permeate
or exclude materials in communities with differing views on morality. Cf Huelster, supra note
2, at 880 (discussing advantages and disadvantages of least and most tolerant community stan-
dards). But see Sergent, supra note 4, at 715 (arguing that changing standards from local to
national will not necessarily prevent censorship of protected speech); Meredith Leigh Fried-
man, Note, Keeping Sex Safe on the Information Superhighway: Computer Pornography and
the First Amendnent, 40 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1025, 1046 (1996) (arguing that a national stan-
dard is not feasible because "residents in the fifty states have such different tastes and attitudes
that a national standard would strangle these differences by the 'absolutism of imposed uni-
formity').
209. See Chiu, supra note 8, at 211 (discussing concerns of national obscenity standard).
210. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (advocating that local community
standards test when used to determine obscenity cannot exceed protections provided by con-
stitution); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 151 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that local standards may violate First Amendment). Some commentators predict that the
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modification of the community standard to make it a more all-
encompassing standard. Their approaches do not attempt to literally
form an obscenity standard that the entire community of the United
States will find constitutionally permissible. Rather, these ap-
proaches purport to remove the subjectiveness associated with differ-
ent local communities and replace it with a more objective standard,
regardless of where the trial is taking place. One approach is to pro-
vide the jury with the instruction: "[d]oes the pornography depict
'explicit harm?" 21' A second approach to obscenity is that the jury
will be asked to determine if the material was produced in an illegal
manner.212 The third suggestion which emphasizes "consent of the
audience" addresses the concern that provided the impetus for en-
acting the CDA; that is, insulating non-consenting adults and minors
from indecent material. 213 This approach would instruct juries that
speech could be obscene if it was exhibited to a "captive, unwilling,
or unconsenting" audience. Implementation of the "consent" ap-
proach addresses the medium characteristics of the Internet by recog-
nizing that people downloading pornography are taking affirmative
and presumptively consenting actions to obtain these materials.2t 4
Court, if it reviews Internet pornography cases, might create "a generic definition of
'obscenity"' which could reverse Miller. Branscomb, supra note 12, at 1948.
211. Huelster, supra note 2, at 880. To answer this question the jury would have to an-
swer in the affirmative: 1) "whether the material depicts one person inflicting serious bodily
harm on another;, 2) whether a participant did not consent before the production of the mate-
rial; and 3) whether a participant in the production of the material was a minor." Id. The third
element is consistent with one of the premises behind the CDA, which is the protection of mi-
nors from obscene material. Id.
212. Id. This once again pertains to minors because involving minors in pornography is
without doubt a forbidden activity. Id.
213. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 513 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that,
"absent some connection to minors, or obtrusive display to unconsenting adults," speech
should not be criminalized as obscene); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. at 119
(arguing that "exaction of criminal penalties for the distribution of obscene materials to con-
senting adults is constitutionally intolerable"); Huelster, supra note 2, at 879 (arguing that
courts should limit obscene speech only when a non-consenting audience exists). The Internet
is a place where "people must choose to become part of the Internet" and each person "has to
decide which site she will visit." Id. Thus, a person wanting to view pornography via the In-
teret must take the initial step forward and solicit their desired information. Id.; Coglianese,
supra note 13, at 416 (describing affirmative actions one must employ to access Internet sites).
214. See Huelster, supra note 2, at 881 (noting that "users initiation of communication
with the service shows intentional and willing access to the information"). The application of
a "consent" standard seems to be more economically viable method than the affirmative de-
fenses provided in the CDA. Rather than forcing BBS providers to spend enormous amount of
money to identify and investigate users of their BBS, the consent method allows the BBS op-
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The consent method extinguishes the need for Miller's local commu-
nity standards because, once again, it rebuts one of Miller's primary
arguments for its obscenity test - the need to protect unwilling par-
ticipants.25 The logic in the "consent" approach is so evident be-
cause the terms "consenting" and "unwilling" are mutually exclu-
sive. This approach is also consistent with the premise in Stanley;
that is, protecting the actions of adults in the privacy of their homes,
because most computer terminals are located in personal residences.
B. Self-Regulation: Can It Work for the Internet?
Rather than rely on the government to regulate the Internet,
computer enthusiasts have proposed self-regulation as a means of
controlling pornography on the Internet.216  Persons in high-
technology industries believe the government is inept and ill-
equipped to regulate the Intemet.2 7 There are two basic non-
erators to use their current technology to identify only the ages of BBS that are in fact solicit-
ing their services. Id.
215. See Coliganese, supra note 13, at 416 (emphasizing that unwilling recipients on In-
teret seem impossible).
216. See id. at 414 (characterizing government regulation of Internet communications as
not only violative of First Amendment but also "knee-jerk response"); Friedman, supra note
208, at 1050 (noting that Internet industry has proposed many ideas and attempts at self-
regulation). The desire to control material downloaded from the Internet has given birth to an
entire new software industry. Id.; see also Stacey J. Rappaport, Note, Rules of the Road: The
Constitutional Limit of Restricting Indecent Speech on the Information Superhighway, 6
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 343 (1995) (arguing that parents, as opposed
to government, should select appropriate material for children to explore on Internet); Internet
Ruling Gives Free Speech Its Due, CHI. SuN-TIMES, June 14, 1996, at 35 (advocating that gov-
ernment should seek "combination of industry self-control and parental involvement to control
children's access").
217. See Robert F. Goldman, Note, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on the
Inteniet: The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29
GA. L. REv. 1075, 1116 (1995) (noting that Congressional bills illustrate problems that occur
when government attempts to regulate obscenity); Rappaport, supra note 216, at 342 (noting
that technology companies, favoring defeat of government censorship, have begun to organize
and develop "standards to filter offensive material from the Internet"); Joshua Quittner, How
Parents Can Filter Out the Naughty Bits, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 45 (stating that Internet hack-
ers are developing self-regulation programs because they are "fearful that Congress will try to
stifle cyberspace with overly broad anti-smut laws"). The CEO of a company that sells
screening software believes the position of censor should be held by parents or whoever con-
trols the computer but not the government. Id. But see Beeson, supra note 6 (asserting self-
regulation is inconsistent by listing titles that were and were not censored). For example, the
author points out that the title "Spring Semester" was censored but the title "Blond Lovers"
was not censored. Id.; Friedman, supra note 208, at 1052 (illustrating mistakes of self-
regulation by pointing out that "alt.sex.bestiality.bamey." site was censored even though it
was actually a BBS for a children's television cartoon character.) On a more serious note, an
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legislative solutions that can be implemented to regulate obscenity on
the Internet. 211 The first solution is software programs that enable
people to control what materials a particular computer can access on
the Intemet.219  These screening software programs are multi-
functional. Some products allow users to prevent access to certain
Internet sites based on the words describing the content of the site.220
Other means of regulating obscenity include a list of sites that are
automatically deemed obscene by the software manufacturers. 221
This system facially addresses the most pressing Internet concern -
harm to children.222 Software programs avoid the legal discord and
debate over the effectiveness of community standards in regulating
obscenity.223
example of identified obscenity sites included the censoring of the word "breast" which pre-
vented access to breast cancer discussion groups. Id. at 1053.
218. See Spett, supra note 99, at 623 (explaining available actions to monitor content on
Internet). The two measures are "software with built-in 'filter' products" and "self-imposed
BBS rating system." Id.
219. See Goldman, supra note 217, at 1117 (noting desire of Internet industry to self-
regulate in hopes of avoiding government censorship). The use of these software programs is
preferred within the industry because it prevents the government from censoring communica-
tion over the Internet. Id.; Doug Abrahms, Exon Move on Internet Porn Grabs Lawmakers,
THE WASH. TIMES, July 19, 1995 at B7 (discussing devices available to parents for regulating
content seen on Internet by children). Even on-line providers such as Prodigy provide its users
with control devices that allow parents to monitor what their children may explore while on the
Internet. Id. But see Meyer, supra note 172, at 1982 (stating that "the overbroad regulation of
speech necessitated by software screening not only captures nonobscene protected speech, but
chills system operators and citizens from engaging in protected speech").
220. See Joe Abernathy, Net Censorship: Alternatives Gain Momentwnn, PC WORLD, Sept.
1995, at 54 (noting some software programs regulate by examining types of words used in
BBS titles).
221. See id. (discussing software manufacturers list of obscene BBS); Raysman & Brown,
supra note 28 (describing usefulness of passwords). If one wants to access this list of Internet
sites, while still policing their children's' interests, a person can install passwords that enable
that person to access the adult-only sites. Id. But see Meyer, supra note 172, at 1989 (positing
that blocking access on Internet is futile because it was "designed to provide multiple access
routes; if any one connection is destroyed, the severed link can be replaced simply by rerout-
ing"). Computer experts frequently comment on this ability by stating that "for every road-
block, there is a detour." Id.
222. Meyer, supra note 172, at 1989. Parents are able, without much hassle or Internet
expertise, buy, install, "and even customize these preventive products." Spelt, supra note 99,
at 623; Leslie Helm, Decision on Internet Decency Basically Upholds the Status Quo, L.A.
TIMES, June 13, 1996, at Dl (stating that Internet industry has developed programs that will
enable "religious groups to develop content ratings systems that reflect their values").
223. See Goldman, supra note 217, at 1118 (noting that software programs allow "more
flexibility over control at the most local level"). The author identifies an asset in the software
programs as permitting its user to conceive not local community standards but local (home)
standards on deciding what is obscene. Id.
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The other means of implementing self-regulation is the creation
of industry-wide ratings and standards. These ratings, similar to mo-
tion picture ratings, could identify obscene networks or Internet
files.224 This mode of self-regulation is a practical alternative be-
cause the Internet is such a difficult concept to grasp. Some people
have argued that if the government is "getting out of the network
business" in terms of funding, then why should Net surfers have to
follow its rules? 225 Computer competent individuals are arguably the
only people qualified to design regulatory methods that do not violate
areas of protected speech;226 courts and legislators, thus, should defer
to the computer industry to address the complex issues raised by the
Internet in a similar way as the courts use the business judgment rule
in corporate law. Internet experts, by being allowed to implement
self-regulation devices, are not imposing their moral judgments but
are merely providing devices that enable parents or whoever is in
charge of the computer terminal to decide what is permissible view-
ing while exploring the information superhighway. These high-tech
geniuses of the Internet industry are the best compromise to ensure
224. See Spett, supra note 99, at 624 (explaining rating system could categorize Internet
sites "based upon their theme and language"). The people who download material onto the
Internet would be required to obey the rating guidelines and be responsible for determining the
appropriate rating of their site. Id. The ratings system would implement regulatory actions
such as "compiling a list of BBS services nationwide, monitoring these services, and enforcing
the regulations imposed." Friedman, supra note 208, at 1051. Proponents of self-regulation
believe their system will bring control away from the government and back to the family. Id.;
Ryga, supra note 5, at 249-50 (comparing Intemet censorship with movie ratings which are
based on age). For example, the classifications would be:
Over 0 - information accessible to all ages;
Over 13 - would be similar to "PG-13";
Over 17 - would be similar to "R", and
Over 21 - would be similar to "X". Id.
Quittner, supra note 217 (stating that consortium of Internet magnates, like Netscape, have
been developing ratings system that should be working by year's end). But see Friedman, su-
pra note 208, at 1051 (discussing difficulties of employing ratings system). However, many
computer enthusiasts believe a self-imposed ratings system would be "unorganized, 'more
work than it's worth,' and 'an attempt to regulate and censor the free flow of information be-
tween members of the general population."' Id.
225. KRoL, supra note 25, at 45.
226. See How Parents Can Filter Out the Naughty Bits, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 45 (noting
that such Internet giants as Microsoft and Netscape have announced plan that will "give re-
sponsible parties more specific guidance about which Internet material is appropriate and
which is not"). But see Meyer, supra note 172 (stating Internet cannot be regulated because of
technological reasons). Meyer notes that it is likely that the computer experts who are em-
ployed to design regulation systems are probably the "very persons who have been posting and
encoding sexual imagery in the first place." Id.
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the protection of children from obscenities, while protecting the pri-
vacy rights of adults.227
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet is rapidly becoming the principal medium that will
enable the world to exchange information and communicate in un-
precedented numbers. Because of its innovative characteristics, the
law has experienced difficulty in its attempts at regulating this unique
communication medium. Courts and legislators have endeavored to
analogize the Internet with other conventional communication medi-
ums in their attempts to regulate or prohibit types of speech that oc-
cur over the Internet.
The Communications Decency Act is the first legislation di-
rectly aimed at regulating the areas of obscene and indecent speech
occurring over the Internet. Although its intent to protect minors and
unconsenting adults from exposure to pornography is certainly a le-
gitimate governmental interest, this legislation is an inadequate solu-
tion to address the cyberspace pornography dilemma. The CDA fails
to recognize the unique characteristics of the Internet and thus, was
properly found unconstitutional by the federal district courts in ACLU
and Shea for infringing upon areas of free speech. A judicial modifi-
cation of the obscenity doctrine, such as expanding the home privacy
right articulated in Stanley or changing the Miller community stan-
dard test from a local to a national standard, is more adept at ad-
dressing obscene and indecent speech that occurs on the information
227. See Spett, supra note 99, at 623 (asserting that "alternatives exist which, if adopted
would simultaneously accomplish the government's interest in preventing exposure of offen-
sive material to children, while maintaining First Amendment protections"); Rappaport, supra
note 218, at 343 (asserting that self-regulation technology "provides a 'clean' version of the
Internet to younger users ... while allowing adults to access their choice of material"); cf. In-
ternet Ruling Gives Free Speech Its Due, C-m. SuN-TIMEs, June 14, 1996, at 35 (noting that
controlling what children view on Internet is parental choice, not governmental directive); I1wo
Federal Lawsuits Filed in Philadelphia Seeking to Overturn the Communications Decency Act,
AP, June 12, 1996, available in, 1996 WL 4427369, (these suits note that parents, not govern-
ment, should decide for their children "what material should come into their homes based on
their own taste and values"). But see Meyer, supra note 172, at 1981 (arguing that neither
Internet ratings systems nor software programs can successfully screen out pornography with-
out restricting access to indecent images). In a more constitutional analysis, Meyer believes
self-regulating measures are unable to "distinguish texts or images which appeal solely to pru-
rient interest" or "assess whether they violate particular community standards." d. Meyer
argues that allowing self-regulated censorship will most likely result in the "overzealous sup-
pression of sexual conversation and imagery, and create complex and costly constitutional liti-
gation." Id.
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superhighway. Another plausible alternative is for the Supreme
Court to either create an obscenity test specifically tailored for Inter-
net speech or allow self-regulation orchestrated by the more qualified
experts within the Internet industry. The allowance of ill-suited leg-
islation, such as the CDA, will unfortunately delay the arrival of the
Internet as the essential medium that simplifies the ability of the
world to freely and inexpensively exchange information and ideas.
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APPENDIX A
Title V-OBSCENITY AND VIOLENCE
Subtitle A-Obscene, Harassing, and Wrongful Utilization of
Telecommunications Facilities
SEC. 501 SHORT TITLE
This title may be cited as the "Communications Decency Act of
1996"
SEC. 502 OBSCENE OR HARASSING USE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES UNDER THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934.
Section 223 (47 U.S.C. 223) is amended
(1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting in lieu thereof:
(a) Whoever
(1)in interstate or foreign communications
(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of any comment, request, sugges-
tion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass another person:
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of any comment, request, sugges-
tion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or
indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under
18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communi-
cation placed the call or initiated the communication;
(C) makes a telephone or utilizes a telecommunications device,
whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without dis-
closing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or har-
ass any person at the called number or who receives the communica-
tions;
(D) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or con-
tinuously to ring with intent to harass any person at the called num-
ber; or
(E) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly initiates com-
munications with a telecommunications device, during which conver-
REVISITING MILLER AFTER CDA
sation or communication ensues, solely to harass any person at the
called number or who receives the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1)
with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under
title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than two years
or both.; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
(d) Whoever
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific
person or persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by con-
temporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or or-
gans, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or
initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under
such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by para-
graph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.
(e) In addition to any other defenses available by law:
(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d)
solely for providing access or connection to or from a facility system,
or network not under that person's control, including transmission,
downloading, intermediate storage, access software, or other related
capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or connection
that does not include the creation of the content of the communica-
tion.
(2) The defenses provided by paragraph (1) of this subsection
shall not be applicable to a person who is a conspirator with an entity
actively involved in the creation or knowing distribution of commu-
nications that violate this section, or who knowingly advertises the
availability of such communications.
(3) The defenses provided by paragraph (1) of this subsection
shall not be applicable to a person who provides access or connection
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to a facility, system, or network engaged in the violation of this sec-
tion that is owned or controlled by such person.
(4) No employer shall be held liable under this section for the
actions of an employee or agent unless the employee's or agent's
conduct is within the scope of his or her employment or agency and
the employer (A) having knowledge of such conduct, authorizes or
ratifies such conduct, or (B) recklessly disregards such conduct.
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or
(d), or under subsection (a)(2) with respect to the use of a facility for
an activity under subsection (a)(1)(B) that a person
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropri-
ate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access mi-
nors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may
involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such com-
munications, including any method which is feasible under available
technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number.
(6) The Commission may describe measures which are reason-
able, effective, and appropriate to restrict access to prohibited com-
munications under subsection (d). Nothing in this section authorizes
the Commission to enforce, or is intended to provide the Commission
with the authority to approve, sanction, or permit, the use of such
measures. The Commission shall have no enforcement authority
over the failure to utilize such measures. The Commission shall not
endorse specific products relating to such measures. The use of such
measures shall be admitted as evidence in good faith efforts for pur-
poses of paragraph (5) in any action arising under subsection (d).
Nothing in this section shall be construed to treat interactive com-
puter services as common carriers or telecommunications carriers.
